lease in 1997 was a matter of no concern. Even at the height of Cultural Revolution radicalism, Chinese troops ensured that rampaging Red Guards were prevented from causing trouble for Hong Kong. When the Portuguese tried to return Macao to China, the Chinese government refused to accept it, in part because the PRC wished to avoid panic in Hong Kong. But this was always a pragmatic economic choice, not a concession of ultimate sovereignty or of the validity of the treaties.
The 1982 Crisis
In 1979, on the occasion of the first visit to China by a Hong Kong governor, Deng Xiaoping said, "Your investors should put their hearts at ease." He repeated that formula in 1981. By 1982, however, according to British government sources, China indicated that it was thinking about the future of Hong Kong. At most, such thoughts were at a very early stage, and China did not feel ready for any formal discussions. But certain important Hong Kong investors, noting that the lease termination date was only fifteen years away, pressed Prime Minister Thatcher to insist on a formal extension of the lease. Mrs. Thatcher, perhaps more responsive to the issue than she would have been in the absence of the earlier Falkland Islands crisis, publicly announced her concern about such requests and raised it with the Chinese during a trip to Beijing in September 1982. The result was a mild communique characterizing their discussions as friendly and announcing diplomatic negotiations to ensure the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.
When she left China, however, Mrs. Thatcher visited Hong Kong and made a speech in the course of which she declared, in reference to Hong Kong, that "treaties are made to be kept." In doing so, she reportedly disregarded the advice of Britain's professional diplomats, whom she regarded as discredited in the context of the Falkland Islands War. The Chinese took this to be an assertion of the validity of Britain's treaty from the Opium War and denounced Mrs. Thatcher bitterly. This diplomatic storm coincided with the peaking of a Hong Kong stock market boom, the nadir of the global recession, and the pricking of the extraordinary Hong Kong real estate bubble. Real estate prices fell about 40%. Because government revenues depend heavily on real estate taxes, this caused a large government budget deficit. The stock market fell from 1445 in August 1982 to 646 in October. Some conspicuous capital flight occurred. The Hong Kong dollar fell in value. Long visa lines formed outside the major Western embassies. The officers of one local subsidiary of a U.S. bank collectively demanded that the bank help them obtain U.S. visas, and the secretaries as a group demanded that the bank pay for Mandarin lessons so they would be ready when China took over. China's stated position is that China's sovereignty over Hong Kong cannot be questioned, but that Beijing will maintain the economic and social status quo in Hong Kong in order to ensure the territory's prosperity. Chinese leaders have explicitly stated that Hong Kong will remain capitalist, that it will remain a free port, and that the interests of local Chinese capitalists, overseas Chinese capitalists, and foreign capitalists will all be protected.6 They have stated that "Hong Kong should be governed by Hong Kong laws."7 The Bank of China has supported the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank's plan to give mortgages running for 20 years.8 China has made substantial investments in Hong Kong and in nearby projects, such as a nuclear power plant, that will be economically viable only if Hong Kong is stable. China has suggested that Hong Kong should be ruled by Chinese, but by local Chinese rather than by PRC Chinese from outside Hong Kong; it has specifically suggested that no Chinese soldiers or administrators would be necessary and that British advisors would be welcomed in the absence of formal British administra- This difficulty creates uncertainties that will have real economic consequences regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. Moreover, the uncertainties have been exacerbated by overreactions on both sides. China reacted with enormous vehemence to Mrs. Thatcher's September 1982 speech in Hong Kong, and in the process probably changed the substance of its own negotiating position to an extent that did not serve China's long-term interests. While Thatcher's speech was ill considered, it could reasonably have been dismissed by Beijing as perfunctory rhetoric. On the Hong Kong side, there was excessive emphasis on the instability of Chinese politics and the implications of this for Hong Kong; but surely the long history of a stable Chinese relationship with Hong Kong, as outlined above, and the protection of Hong Kong even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, underline the stability of China's position on the subject.
While uncertainties persist, there will be some capital flight. More importantly at the moment, there is a tendency for capital to bypass Hong Kong and a tendency for indigenous capital to avoid longer-term investments. The Hong Kong government and the PRC are quick to reassure people that there is net capital inflow to Hong Kong. But the statistics measure only flows through banks, and much of Hong Kong's capital does not circulate through banks. The statistics also do not measure the extent to which Hong Kong has missed opportunities for capital inflow, the extent to which special inflows from Indonesia and elsewhere have sometimes masked important outflows, the extent to which government manipulation of the way it pays its own bills has masked outflows, and the extent to which the people of Hong Kong have shifted their holdings from Hong Kong currency into other currencies. (This latter shift, worsened by tax discrimination in favor of foreign currencies, has weakened the Hong Kong dollar.) There is limited panic outflow, but there is a large opportunity cost.
The uncertainty affects the sectoral growth of Hong Kong. Much of Hong Kong's economy, notably textile manufacturing, thrives on a short-term, risk-averse perspective, and is little affected by current uncertainties. Textiles continue to flourish. Hong Kong's role as a tourist center and entrepot is somewhat affected by uncertainties, but not much. Indeed, in the short run, the cheap Hong Kong dollar has substantially enhanced tourism. For the important electronics industry, there may be a more significant cost. Although Hong Kong can work wonders overnight in many aspects of electronics, the pace of change in key parts of the electronics industry may require somewhat longer-term investment these days (there are legitimate controversies about this). Certainly the electronics industry requires a middle class with high technological skills. Probably the greatest cost to Hong Kong of the current uncertainty is the fear within this middle class that their families have no future in Hong Kong; when this group shifts, as much of it has, from enthusiastic devotion to raising a family and fortune in Hong Kong to preoccupation with an assured escape route, the electronics industry has a long-term problem.
The most severe problem is that of the overbuilt real estate industry. Much of the important building activity assumes payback periods of 15 to 20 years. The real estate market is so glutted that only a broad-based, longer-term recovery can match demand to supply. Real estate therefore will not revive completely in the presence of uncertainty about the immediate future and the 13-year future. As noted earlier, other key aspects of the economy are, for the time being, greatly affected by real estate.
Finally, the future of Hong Kong is connected to that of the adjacent special economic zones of China, notably Shenzhen. These are areas where China has allowed foreign firms special access, created exceptions to China's economic rules in order to attract foreign capital, and provided special infrastructure. They are halfway houses to Hong Kong, designed to serve the same purposes as Hong Kong: gaining the economic benefits of Western methods while limiting the exposure of the Chinese population to Western culture. Much of China's grand economic strategy depends on the success of these zones.
Fear has been expressed that, if these are too successful, then Hong Kong could become obsolete. So far, the opposite seems to be occurring. under democratic self-rule would be likely if Hong Kong had a homogeneous population that understood and uniformly accepted those rules, including meek acquiescence by the losers in the economic struggle. But in fact the rules are imposed by the British on exceedingly diverse and assertive population groups, many of which neither fully comprehend nor fully accept the system that produces their economic benefits. Hence, autonomy and full democracy would mean slower growth. This would not serve China's economic interests, but some approximation of it is not an unthinkable outcome. Probably, though, China and Britain would both perceive themselves as having such an interest in more rapid growth and would both sufficiently fear explosive forces within a slower growing Hong Kong that they would prefer a system more centrally controlled in politics and more free-wheeling in economics.
Singapore scenario An evolution along the lines of Singapore, which began as a somewhat leftist welfare-state democracy but quickly evolved into a one-party-dominant state under Lee Kwan Yew, would serve everyone's economic interests and would gratify Britain politically. But China would do whatever was necessary to resist the rise of a political leader as strong as Lee. Moreover, strong political leadership on the Lee Kwan Yew model presupposes Singapore-style government control of the economy; movement from Hong Kong's almost laissez-faire system to Singaporean state-managed entrepreneurship would be a drastic transformation, potentially disastrous if done quickly.
Because each of these self-rule scenarios has severe defects from Beijing's point of view, as well as from that of Hong Kong's population, a quick move toward any of these scenarios in any pure form would bring a collapse of confidence. In May 1983 a group of Hong Kong leaders led by Allen Lee bluntly informed Beijing that this was so.12 Thus, despite China's early enthusiasm for self-rule, within the social and economic status quo, such a scenario has risks that would threaten full economic success. More desirable for those who seek to preserve Hong Kong's economic dynamism is an upgrading of local influence that stops far short of full democratic self rule. To the extent that Hong Kong moves toward docile self-rule of any kind, it will sacrifice its extraordinary economic dynamism.
Some people initially believed in a Hong Kong ruled by a Chineseappointed communist official who, however, would have the job of maintaining Hong Kong's existing system. This certainly would not be stable, because any communist official, or even Beijing-appointed noncom- the fact of elections, could conceivably manage Hong Kong so as to preserve its ruthless dynamism. Those who advocate democracy would not be happy with such a system. The key point here is that PRC and British economic goals, which are the paramount interests of those two powers, would be well served by such a system. The new Chinese, constitution permits "special administrative zones," Communist China has always had autonomous regions, Chinese tradition legitimizes such pragmatic arrangements, and China is anxious to demonstrate to Taiwan that such a formula can work. Presumably this is the outcome most desired by realistic British negotiators. But it would be acceptable to China only if Britain were to capitulate completely on all symbolic issues associated with sovereignty. China would probably also require substantial upgrading of the representation of local Chinese in the Hong Kong government at the expense of expatriates. China would then designate Hong Kong a special administrative zone.
Such a system seems the logical outcome of British and Chinese national interests and of current negotiating trends. In theory, it would work. There is no guarantee, however, that the two powers will concur completely or that, even if they concur, they will find a fully workable solution on the first try. To the extent that they miss the mark, Hong Kong's future economic performance will decline from the roughly ten percent per year performance of the past generation. If there is a problem, it would most likely consist of too much Beijing influence, too much influence by pressure groups indigenous to Hong Kong, too much uncertainty about the details of the 1997 transition, too much regulation (including requirements to disclose information or to obtain prior approval for key decisions), or too much uncertainty about the ways in which the previously discussed prerequisites of economic success are to be defended.
If there is a significant decline in economic dynamism, this would not inherently constitute a disaster. If, for instance, growth declined from ten percent to five or six percent, this would still be far superior to the economic performance of most of the Third World. But in Hong Kong there would be risks even in such relatively superior performance. Long-run expectations of five or six percent growth would create enormous incentives for the professional class to emigrate; the political and economic risks of Hong Kong are acceptable only if offset by extraordinary opportunity. Hong Kong's economy depends on the commitment of large numbers of professionals and entrepreneurs to focus their short-term attention on making money in Hong Kong rather than on escaping, and on their long-term commitment to raise families in Hong Kong. Thus expectations of a serious reduction in growth rates are more serious in Hong Kong than elsewhere; there is a potential multiplier effect at work in the decline of professional and entrepreneurial commitment and in the willingness of the working class to accept Hong Kong's rigors.
In summary, there is a theoretical solution to the dilemma of Hong Kong. This solution would not be rigorously democratic, but it could be politically popular and economically successful. But the success of the negotiations does not ensure the success of the economy, and the negotiated political outcome will not be durable if economic performance deteriorates too much. Both sides are negotiating in good faith. Both have long records of honoring their commitments. But no guarantee of the status quo until 1997 and of the socioeconomic status quo for 50 years thereafter will be sustainable if uncertainties or misjudgments create a hemorrhage of professionals and entrepeneurs. Expectations of declining growth could trigger a sudden, early crisis of confidence that would force Beijing's intervention, or longer-term declines could force Beijing to exercise more supervision. Or, realization of such difficulties could lead to favorable course corrections. The end of the negotiations may well prove to be just the beginning of the shaping of Hong Kong's future.
